A firm issues a convertible bond. At each subsequent time, the bondholder must decide whether to continue to hold the bond, thereby collecting coupons, or to convert it to stock. The bondholder wishes to choose a conversion strategy to maximize the bond value. Subject to some restrictions, the bond can be called by the issuing firm, which presumably acts to maximize the equity value of the firm by minimizing the bond value. This creates a two-person game. We show that if the coupon rate is below the interest rate times the call price, then conversion should precede call. On the other hand, if the dividend rate times the call price is below the coupon rate, call should precede conversion. In either case, the game reduces to a problem of optimal stopping.
Introduction. Firms raise capital by issuing debt (bonds) and equity (shares of stock). The convertible bond is intermediate between these two instruments.
A convertible bond is a bond in that it entitles its owner to receive coupons plus the return of principal at maturity. However, prior to maturity the holder may convert the bond, surrendering it for a preset number of shares of stock. The price of the bond is thus dependent on the price of the firm's stock. Finally, prior to maturity, the firm may call the bond, forcing the bondholder to either surrender it to the firm for a previously agreed price or convert it to stock as above.
After issuing a convertible bond, the firm's objective is to exercise its call option in order to maximize the value of shareholder equity. The bondholder's objective is to exercise the conversion option in order to maximize the value of the bond. Because the firm must pay coupons to the bondholder, it may call the bond if it can subsequently reissue a bond with a lower coupon rate. This happens as the firm's fortunes improve, for then the risk of default has diminished and investors will accept a lower coupon rate on the firm's bonds. In the case of a convertible bond, the firm has a second incentive to call: as the firm's fortunes improve, the investor may convert, becoming a shareholder of a profitable firm and diluting the value of the stock owned by the original shareholders. The firm can prevent this by calling the bond. The bondholder has an incentive to convert the bond to stock before maturity under exactly the same scenario; the bondholder may want to become a shareholder of a profitable firm, for the promise of future dividends may be more valuable than the promise of future coupons.
If stock and convertible bonds are the only assets issued by a firm, then the value of the firm is the aggregate value of these two types of assets. In idealized markets, where the Miller-Modigliani [32] , [33] assumptions hold (see Hennessy and Tserlukevich [20] for a model in which they do not), changes in corporate capital structure do not affect firm value. In particular, the value of the firm does not change at the time of conversion, and the only change in the value of the firm at the time of call is a reduction by the call price paid to the bondholder if the bondholder surrenders rather than converting the bond. By acting to maximize the value of equity, the firm is in fact minimizing the value of the convertible bond. By acting to maximize the value of the bond, the bondholder is in fact minimizing the value of equity. This creates a two-person, zero-sum game. The game is complicated by the fact that one can expect the dividend payment policy of the firm to depend on the bond price, a feature explicitly modeled in this paper. This feature causes the bond price to be governed by a nonlinear second-order partial differential equation, a novel feature of this paper. This is a companion paper to Sîrbu, Pikovsky, and Shreve [36] . In [36] , the bond did not mature and hence time was not a variable, whereas in the present paper, the bond has finite maturity and the bond price depends on the time to maturity.
Brennan and Schwartz [8] and Ingersoll [22] address the convertible bond pricing problem via the arbitrage pricing theory developed by Merton [30] , [31] and underlying the option pricing formula of Black and Scholes [7] . In the Brennan-Schwartz [8] model, dividends and coupons are paid at discrete dates. Between these dates, the value of the firm is a geometric Brownian motion and the price of the convertible bond is governed by the linear partial differential equation developed by Black and Scholes [7] . This sets up a backward recursion over payment dates, which permits a numerical solution of the bond pricing problem but is not readily amenable to qualitative analysis. In Ingersoll [22] , coupons are paid out continuously. For most of the results obtained in [22] , dividends are zero, and because of this the bond price is again governed by a linear partial differential equation.
The present paper differs from the classical literature in a second respect. In [8] , the bond should not be converted except possibly immediately prior to a dividend payment; in [22] , the bond should not be converted except possibly at maturity. Therefore, neither of these papers needs to address the free boundary problem that arises if early conversion (other than at discrete dates) is optimal.
Ingersoll [22] provides a heuristic argument that the firm should call as soon as the conversion value of the bond (the value the bondholder would receive if he converts the bond to stock) rises to the call price. It is observed that firms tend to call later than this, and several reasons have been advanced to explain this departure from the model; see, e.g., [2] , [3] , [16] , [19] , [23] . We show here by a rigorous analysis of the model that, although the Ingersoll conclusion is often valid, it is also possible that the firm should call before the conversion value of the bond rises to the call price. In these cases, explanation of observed firm behavior is more difficult than previously believed.
The present paper assumes that a firm's value comprises equity and convertible bonds. To simplify the discussion, we assume that equity is in the form of a single share of stock, and that there is a single convertible bond. We assume that the value of the issuing firm has constant volatility, the bond continuously pays coupons at a fixed rate, and the firm continuously pays dividends at a rate that is a fixed fraction of equity. Default occurs if the coupon payments cause the firm value to fall to zero, in which case the bond has zero recovery. In this model, both the bond price and the stock price are functions of the underlying firm value. Because the stock price is the difference between firm value and bond price, and dividends are paid proportionally to the stock price, the differential equation characterizing the bond price as a function of the firm value is nonlinear.
In section 2 we provide a no-arbitrage argument, which states that once the firm and the bondholder choose their call and conversion strategies, the price of the bond is the expected value under the risk-neutral measure of the cash flows that accrue from ownership of the bond. The determination of the optimal call and conversion strategies then becomes a Dynkin game between the firm and the bondholder, and the bond is almost a game option in the sense of Kifer [26] . In contrast to [26] , here the evolution of the underlying process, the firm value, depends on the solution to the game. Kallsen and Kühn [24] consider a game option setting that includes this possibility.
Recognizing that convertible bond pricing is a game is implicit in previous work. For example, [8] observes that the pricing problem " . . . results in a pair of conversioncall strategies which are in equilibrium in the sense that neither party could improve his position by adopting any other strategy." Here we make the game explicit and obtain a good qualitative description of its value. In particular, if the dividend rate is below the interest rate, then the game reduces to one of two possible optimal stopping problems, either the problem of optimal call or the problem of optimal conversion, and we are able to determine in advance from the model parameters which of these two problems is relevant.
Convertible bonds can have several features that must be captured by any model intended for practical application; see [29] . These include periods of call protection, time-dependent conversion factors, and exposure to interest rate and default risk. The model of this paper captures only the default risk, and that via a simple structural model in which default occurs at the time the firm value falls to zero. Loschak [27] allows nonconvertible senior debt and uses a more sophisticated structural model for default. Brennan and Schwartz [9] also allow senior debt. Another interesting issue is the process of conversion when bonds are held by competing investors; see Constantinides [11] and Constantinides and Rosenthal [12] .
Practical models have been built around the idea that the cash flow from a convertible bond can be separated into an "equity" part, which should be discounted at the interest rate, and a "bond" part, which should be discounted at the interest rate plus a credit spread. Papers taking this approach are McConnell and Schwartz [28] , Cheung and Nelken [10] , Ho and Pteffer [21] , Tsiveriotis and Fernandes [39] , and Yigitbasioglu [40] . Ayache, Forsyth, and Vetzal [4] analyze some of this work and conclude that its failure to account for the effect of default on equity introduces significant pricing errors. This deficiency is corrected in Davis and Lischka [14] , Takahashi, Kobayashi, and Nakagawa [38] , and Andersen and Buffum [1] , who build intensitybased models for default affecting equity value. We describe our model in section 2 and report our main results in section 3. In particular, the Dynkin game that describes the bond price reduces to one of two optimal stopping problems and a fixed point problem. Section 4 provides a probabilistic justification for the reduction of the game to optimal stopping. Viscosity solution results concerning the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations governing the optimal stopping problems are provided in section 5. This permits the proof in section 6 of the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the fixed point problem, and this solution is the bond pricing function. Section 7 relates this paper to perpetual convertible bonds. In section 8 we provide some results on the nature of the stopping and continuation regions of the optimal stopping problems of this paper.
The model.
We denote the value of the firm at each time t by X t . We assume the value of the firm consists of equity and debt. The debt D t is due to a single outstanding convertible bond. This assumption of a single bond means that all debt is called and/or converted simultaneously. We denote by S t the total value of equity, which, following the standard finance model (e.g., Merton [31, bottom of p. 453]) is given by
Equity owners receive dividends paid continuously over time at a rate δS t , and the bondholder receives coupons paid continuously over time at a rate c. We assume that δ ≥ 0 and c > 0 are both constant. If there is no call or conversion prior to maturity T , then at maturity the bondholder receives the par value L from the firm, provided X T ≥ L. Otherwise, the bondholder receives X T . However, at any time t ∈ [0, T ], the bondholder may convert the bond to stock, thereby immediately receiving stock valued at the conversion factor γ ∈ (0, 1) times the firm value X t . The firm value is not affected by this conversion. On the other hand, at any time t when X t ≥ K, the firm may call the bond, forcing the bondholder to either immediately surrender the bond in exchange for the call price K or else immediately convert the bond as described above. We assume K ≥ L > 0; it is common to have L = K. If K were less than L, then L would be irrelevant since the firm could always call at maturity to avoid paying L.
In order to model the firm value process, which is the primitive in our analysis, we note that, prior to maturity, as long as the bond has not been called or converted and the firm value has not fallen to zero, there are three financial instruments in the market: the stock, the convertible bond(s), and a money market account with risk-free rate of interest r > 0. The wealth V t of an investor holding Δ t shares of stock and Γ t convertible bonds at each time t, investing or borrowing in the money market account as necessary in order to finance this, evolves according to the stochastic differential equation (2.2) and the discounted wealth thus satisfies
Such an investor should not be able to produce arbitrage. To ensure this, according to the first fundamental theorem of asset pricing, both the discounted stock price plus the cumulative discounted dividend payments,
and the discounted convertible bond price plus the cumulative discounted coupons,
must be local martingales under some risk-neutral probability measure P (see the argument due to [18] and developed in great generality by [15] ). Adding the above equations, using the relation X t = S t + D t , we obtain 
where W t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is a Brownian motion under the risk-neutral probability measure P. This is the starting point of our model, and it is a common starting point for treatments of the convertible bond pricing problem; see, e.g., [8] , [22] . Equation (2.5) says that under the risk-neutral measure the mean rate of growth of X t is the interest rate r adjusted by the payouts being made.
Finally, we observe from (2.5) that X t ≤ X 0 e (r− We generalize slightly the previous discussion by permitting the initial time to be s ∈ [0, T ] rather than requiring it to be 0. We shall price the bond at time s under the assumption that X s = x. Given these initial conditions, we denote by X 0 }, there is simultaneous call and conversion, and the conversion takes priority. This is the standard contractual specification for convertible bonds. There is no requirement that call or conversion must take place, and we capture the absence of call (respectively, conversion) by permitting ρ = ∞ (respectively, 
3. The method and principal results. We must deal with the fact that the process S t in section 2 is endogenous. In fact, the bond price, the firm value, and the equity value S t are related by (2.1). Just as in [8] , [22] , [31] , and even [7] , for the case of options rather than convertible bonds, we make the ansatz that there is a function g(t, x) such that prior to call and conversion, D t = g(t, X t ) and hence S t = X t − g(t, X t ). This is a reasonable step because the only source of uncertainty in the model is the uncertainty in the firm value (equivalently, the uncertainty in the Brownian motion driving the firm value), and thus all asset prices should depend on only this and the time variable.
We eventually see (Lemma 4.1 below) that if γX t ≥ K, then it is optimal to convert, and hence D t = γX t . Hence, the function g(t, x) should satisfy
Also, we expect both the value of the bond and the value of the equity to increase with increasing firm value, which is equivalent to
The bond is never worth less than its conversion value and never worth more than the firm value. Since the firm can always call when γx ≤ K, in which case the call does not result in conversion, the bond is not worth more than the call price. In other words,
We shall show that within the collection of functions
there exists a unique function g * such that g * (t, X t ) gives a bond price consistent with our modeling assumptions.
To get started, we simply choose an arbitrary g ∈ G and define
We substitute this value of S t into (2.5), thereby obtaining a stochastic differential equation for X. The Lipschitz continuity (3.2) guarantees that corresponding to every initial condition (s, x) ∈ [0, T ] × [0, ∞) this equation has a strong solution, and we thus obtain X s,x . We proceed as in section 2 and conclude with the function J of (2.7), which we now denote J g .
For each fixed g ∈ G, we can construct a Dynkin game, where now the evolution of the underlying process is specified by (2.5) and (3.4). Kallsen and Kühn [24] show that the value of this game will be the no-arbitrage price of the bond, provided the function g has been chosen "correctly" (see the next paragraph). This game has lower and upper values
This is a consequence of the theory of Dynkin games, but rather than appeal to that theory, we obtain (3.5) as a by-product of our characterization of the solution of the game; see Lemma 4.1 and Propositions 4.5 and 4.6 below.
The function v g = v g provides the price of the convertible bond if we choose g to be the pricing function of the convertible bond. That is to say, we want to find a function g
We shall prove the following. Theorem 3.1. T maps G into G and has a unique fixed point g * . When x = 0, the only stopping time in S T,x is τ ≡ T , whereas when 0 < x ≤ K γ , the set S T,x also contains the stopping time τ ≡ ∞. When x = 0, the only stopping in S T,x K is ρ = T , whereas when 0 < x < K, the only stopping time in S
It is now straightforward to compute v g (T, x) and v g (T, x) for 0 ≤ x ≤ K γ , and irrespective of the choice of g, this results in the terminal convertible bond pricing function g * (T, ·) given by
Because g * also satisfies (3.1), we need only describe this function on [0, 
satisfying (3.6) and (3.7). Remark 3.5. The proofs in this paper do not actually require standing assumption (2.6), but rather that either c ≤ rK or δK ≤ c. Under either of these conditions, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 hold. However, Theorem 3.6 below requires (2.6) for the pricing of the perpetual convertible bond; see [36] . Theorem 3.6. As the time to maturity approaches ∞, the price of the finitematurity convertible bond approaches the price of the perpetual convertible bond of [36] , which is characterized in Theorem 7.2 below, and this convergence is uniform in the firm value.
4. Construction and properties of v g .
Reduction to
s,x K , and thus
But directly from their definitions, we know that
We fix a function g ∈ G for the remainder of section 4.
Modification of payoffs.
The contractual features of convertible bonds require that we define the value of the bond by (2.7) once the call and conversion strategies ρ and τ are specified. This formulation is not readily amenable to analysis, since the stopping times are allowed to take the value ∞, the different players have different sets of stopping times at their disposal, and the payoff in the event of call is not always less than or equal to the payoff in the event of conversion. In this section we create an auxiliary problem that has all these desirable features, and we subsequently show in Propositions 4.5 and 4.6 that both problems have the same value.
We restrict our attention to stopping times in S
In particular, we do not allow stopping times to take the value ∞ and we do not require the call strategy ρ to satisfy X
0 }. We also change the payoffs appearing in (2.7). We define
and ψ = ϕ on the parabolic boundary
The interpretation of J g is that if the firm value is insufficient to pay the call price at the time of the call, then the bondholder receives the firm value. Also, call takes priority over conversion, but the bondholder receives the conversion value if that is greater than the call price at the time of the call. We show in Propositions 4.5 and 4.6 that changing the payoffs in this way does not change the value of the convertible bond pricing problem. We begin with the following straightforward modification of Lemma 4.1.
Technical preparations. Itô's formula implies that if h is a continuous function on
on the interior of its domain, and the derivatives of h have limits at the boundary of its domain, then for (s, We extend g to a jointly continuous function, globally Lipschitz in its second
can be defined by (2.5) and (3.4) for all t ∈ [s, T ]. We define X s,x t = x for t ∈ [0, s). All the processes X s,x are defined on the same probability space (Ω, F, P) and take values in 
there is a sequence n ↓ 0, depending on s, x, and ω, such that X 
and observing that because the argument of ψ is in ∂ p D 0 , where ψ is bounded and continuous, (4.
Characterization of game value. Proposition 4.5 (Case I). Assume c ≤ rK. In this case, we define
Proof. The claims about v g for x > K γ follow immediately from Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2. We thus restrict our attention to 0
because of (3.3), and the above argument applied with h 2 in place of
Because of this and (4.13),
Step 2: Optimal stopping time. The theory of optimal stopping we use here requires that we replace ψ on the right-hand side of (4.9) with a continuous function. Let c ∈ (0, c) be given, and let k be the continuous function defined by (4.7). For 0 ≤ s < T and 0 < x < K γ , we have
Being the maximum of two continuous functions, ψ is continuous. Also, ψ ≤ ψ ≤ v g .
According to the principle of dynamic programming, 
Step 4: Proof of (4.10). With τ ∈ S 
On the other hand, with ρ * defined as in Step 3 and Step 1: Construction of bounds on v g . Define h 3 (t, x) γx and h 2 (t,
, and apply (4.5) and (4.26) to conclude
Taking the infimum over ρ, we obtain
We repeat the above argument with h 2 and ρ = θ (4.12) to reverse the first inequality and ϕ ≤ h 2 to reverse the second, to obtain
where h 2 is strictly greater than ϕ, the second inequality in (4.29) is strict for such (s, x). This implies
Step 2: Optimal stopping time. Let c ∈ (c, ∞) be given and let k be defined by (4.7). For 0 ≤ s < T and 0 < x < K γ , using the second part of (4.7), we have 
We set Step 3: Optimal strategies for the game. Because of (4.31), we have that 
Step 4. Proof of (4.25 We return to (4.11), replacing τ with ρ and using the fact that when 0 ≤ s < T and 0 < x < 
Membership of v g in G.
To show that v g ∈ G whenever g ∈ G, we must verify that v g is continuous and satisfies (3.1)-(3.3). Property (3.1) is provided by Propositions 4.5 and 4.6. When c ≤ rK, we obtain the lower bound in (3.3) directly from (4.9) and the fact that ψ ≥ γx, and (4.13) provides the upper bound. When δK ≤ C, the upper bound in (3.3) comes from (4.24), the fact that 
Gronwall's inequality implies (X
Let τ , ρ ∈ S 0,x T be the stopping times appearing in (4.44) corresponding to the initial condition (0, x). For every τ ∈ S 0,x , we have
whenever τ ∈ S 0,y T , and for z = x and z = y, we have
This establishes the second inequality in (4.43).
The set of stopping times S
0,x
T is the set of all stopping times of the form τ ∧ θ 0,x 0 , where τ is any stopping time in the set S T of all stopping times satisfying τ ≤ T almost surely. Therefore,
Thus, to prove the first inequality in (4.43), it suffices to show that 
From (4.48) and (4.49), using the fact that 0 ≤ v g (t, x) ≤ K, we obtain
Continuity of s → v g (s, x) follows from this and (4.45). . Proposition 4.6 shows that when δK ≤ c, the convertible bond pricing problem reduces to the problem of optimal call. In particular, (4.36) and (4.39) show that the bondholder should use the conversion strategy τ * of (4.38). Note that at maturity, τ * mandates conversion if and only if the conversion value γX s,x T exceeds the par value L. These are the main assertions of Theorem 3.2. In this section, we examine the versions of (3.8) and (3.9) appropriate for the situation with g ∈ G chosen a priori. These equations are
Viscosity solution characterization of
where L g is given by (4.6). The proofs that the value function of the optimal stopping problem (4.9) satisfies (5.1) and that the value function of problem (4.24) satisfies (5.2), both in the viscosity sense on (0, T ) × 0, K γ (see Definition 5.1 below), are standard and are omitted. Uniqueness of the continuous viscosity solutions of (5.1) and (5.2) subject to the boundary conditions (3.6) and (3.7) follows from Lemma 6.1 below; see Remark 6.2.
We refer the reader to [13] and [17] for a detailed development of the theory of second-order viscosity solutions for Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations and to [34] for an application of this theory to optimal stopping. function v is a viscosity subsolution of (5.1) (respectively, (5.2) ) if, for every point
A function v is a viscosity solution of one of these equations if it is both a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity supersolution.
The pricing function for the convertible bond satisfies a variational inequality, and the solution of a variational inequality is often the solution to a free boundary problem, where the "free boundary" divides the region in which an action (conversion or call) should take place from a region in which no action should occur. We show in section 8 that the bond pricing function does indeed satisfy a free boundary problem, and we derive properties of the free boundary. To prepare for that analysis, we introduce the following sets.
In Case I (c ≤ rK) of Proposition 4.5, we define the continuation set 
The equality is justified by the same argument that justified the equality in (5.3) and the additional observation that ψ(T, ·) = ψ(T, ·). The set S I T is closed. Under the Case I assumption, v g is a viscosity solution of (5.1), which is equivalent to the following three conditions:
In Case II (δK ≤ c) of Proposition 4.6, we define the continuation set 
The equality is justified by the argument that justified (5.4) and the additional obser-
Under the Case II assumption, v g is a viscosity solution of (5.2), which is equivalent to the following conditions: 6. Proof of Theorem 3.1. In this section we prove Theorem 3.1 and also prove that the continuous viscosity solutions of (5.1) and (5.2) with boundary conditions (3.6) and (3.7) are unique. In light of Propositions 4.5 and 4.6 and the discussion of section 5, this provides the final step in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
For ∈ 0, K γ , we define the sets
their parabolic boundaries
and their topological boundaries
In 
Then for every λ ≥ 0, we have
Proof. We provide the proof under the assumptions that u is a subsolution of (6.1) and v is a supersolution of (6.2). Because f , g, u, and v are continuous, it suffices to prove ξ . In terms of these functions, we need to prove that for every ∈ 0,
We can then let η ↓ 0 in (6.8) to obtain (6.7) and conclude the proof.
The change of variable transforms (6.1) and (6.2) into
On the set
the function u is a viscosity subsolution of 9) and so for η > 0, the function u η is also a viscosity subsolution of this equation on
λt+ξ , and v is a viscosity supersolution of
(6.10)
Let us assume that (6.8) is violated for some η > 0 and ∈ 0, K γ . This means that
Let α > 0 be given, and set
The maximum is attained at some point (t α , ξ α , ζ α ). According to a slight variant of Lemma 3.1 of [13] ,
Violation of (6.8) implies that for large α, the points (t α , ξ α ) and (t α , ζ α ) are bounded away from the parabolic boundary ∂ p D . Furthermore, because lim t↓0 u η (t, ξ) = −∞, these points are bounded away from the topological boundary ∂ D as well. There are two cases to consider. In the first case, (t α , ξ α ) / ∈ C u , and so u (6.13) In the other case, (t α , ξ α ) is in C u . Because u η is a subsolution of (6.9) in a neighborhood of (t α , ξ α ), v is a supersolution of (6.10) in a neighborhood of (t α , ζ α ), and these points are bounded away from ∂ D , condition (8.5) of Theorem 8.3 of [13] is satisfied (our time variable is reversed from that of [13] ). That theorem with = Letting α → ∞ in (6.13) and (6.17), using (6.12), and using the uniform continuity of g on D , we contradict (6.11) .
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Set λ δ + 1 and endow G with the metric
Under this metric, G is complete. Let f, g ∈ G be given, and define u = T f and v = T g. According to subsection 4.5, u and v are in G. In particular, (6.5) is satisfied. We apply Lemma 6.1, noting that u and v are viscosity solutions of (6.1) and (6.2), respectively, or viscosity solutions of (6.3) and (6.4), respectively, and they agree on ∂ p D 0 , to conclude that
Reversing the roles of f and g, we obtain the contraction property for T . Remark 6.2. Uniqueness of the continuous viscosity solution of (6.1) or (6.3) with boundary conditions (3.6) and (3.7) follows from Lemma 6.1 with f = g.
Asymptotic behavior.
We relate the problem of this paper to the perpetual convertible bond. To do this, we reverse time, denoting by u L (t, x) the price of the bond for fixed par value L ∈ [0, K] when the time to maturity is t and the firm value is x. This section requires standing assumption (2.6). We have the following variation of Lemma 6.1.
Lemma 7.1. Fix T > 0 and let g 1 and
be a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity supersolution, respectively, of
or a viscosity subsolution and viscosity supersolution, respectively, of
where N is the nonlinear operator
Assume that either g 1 or g 2 satisfies (3.2). If g 1 (0, ·) ≤ g 2 (0, ·) and
In particular, if g 1 and g 2 are viscosity solutions of (7.1) or (7.2), g 1 (0, ·) = g 2 (0, ·), and equality holds in both parts of (7.3), then g 1 = g 2 .
Proof. Apply the time-reversed version of Lemma 6.1 with λ = 0, u = f = g 1 , and v = g = g 2 to conclude that
Regardless of the initial time to maturity, as a function of the firm value and remaining time to maturity, the convertible bond price must satisfy one (or both) of (7.1) and (7.2), depending on whether c ≤ rK or δK ≤ c. The uniqueness assertion in Lemma 7.1 guarantees that while the bond price does depend on the time to maturity, it does not depend on the time when the bond was issued, or equivalently, it does not depend on the initial time to maturity.
A perpetual convertible bond never matures, and hence the time variable and the par value are irrelevant. Its price p(x) is a function of the underlying firm value alone. The following result is proved in [36] . 
Uniqueness of p in [36] is proved only in the class of functions that are smooth in the continuation region, not within the class of all continuous functions. We upgrade the uniqueness result to the larger class here. and satisfies (7.4) . Proof. We provide the proof for the case c ≤ rK. In the second case, δK ≤ c, a similar proof is possible.
Let q ∈ C 0, K γ be a viscosity solution of (7.1) on 0,
as a test function for the viscosity supersolution q to obtain
Subtracting these relations, we obtain
But 0 ≤ p (x 0 ) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ δ < r, so we have a contradiction to (7.5) . Assume on the other hand that
, and if x 0 = C * o , so that p is twice continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of x 0 , we can use p + q(x 0 ) − p(x 0 ) as a test function for the viscosity subsolution q to obtain
and we conclude as before.
The only other possibility is that (7.6) holds and 
as a test function for the viscosity subsolution q as above. This leads to (7.7), with p (x 0 −) replacing p (x 0 ). Inequality (7.8) holds for all x ∈ (0, x 0 ), and letting x ↑ x 0 , we obtain (7.8), with p (x 0 −) replacing p (x 0 ) as well. This implies (7.9), and (7.6) is contradicted.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. The terminal condition (3.6), with time reversed, states that for 0 ≤ L ≤ K, we have
The functions u 0 , u L , and u K are continuous viscosity solutions of (7.1) or (7.2), depending on whether c ≤ rK or δK ≤ c. Lemma 7.1 and the membership of u 0 and
, and we can apply Lemma 7.1 with
In other words, u 0 (t, x) is nondecreasing in t for each fixed x. On the other hand, t 1 , x) , and this leads to the conclusion that u K (t, x) is nonincreasing in t for each fixed x. Both u 0 (t, ·) and u K (t, ·) are Lipschitz continuous with constant 1, and the Arzela-Ascoli theorem implies that they converge uniformly on 0, K γ to Lipschitz continuous limits u − (·) and u + (·), respectively, as t → ∞. Uniform convergence preserves the viscosity solution property (see [13] ), and so u − and u + are also continuous viscosity solutions of either (7.1) or (7.2). Lemma 7.3 implies u − = p = u + . Relation (7.10) then implies lim t→∞ u L (t, x) = p(x) for all x ∈ 0, 
In Case II (δK ≤ c) we have
Proof. In Case I, we must show that if u L (t, x) = γx for some x ∈ 0, 
